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THE NUMBERS GAME: STATISTICAL
INFERENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
.David H. Kaye*

STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION. By .David Baldus and
James Cole. Colorado Springs: Shepard's, Inc. 1980. Pp. xx, 376.

$55.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that "[f]or the rational
study oflaw the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but
the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." 1 To many of his day, this "man of statistics" may have
seemed like the perfect attorney for Holmes's quintessential client,
"the bad man." 2 The two of them, Holmes might have said, would
"stink in the nostrils" of those who would introduce as much fuzziness into the law as they could.3 Presently, however, there are those
who proclaim that Holmes's prophecy has come true. 4 To be sure,
the proper role for microeconomic analysis in legal discourse continues to be hotly debated, 5 but few would deny that quantitative methods are becoming increasingly important in litigation. Especially in
cases alleging discrimination, judges and commentators have observed that "statistics often tell much, and the Courts listen."6
Whether this infusion of numerical methods into legal proceedings
evokes feelings of approbation or revulsion, it seems clear that at
least a rudimentary knowledge of statistical reasoning is essential if
attorneys and judges are to function effectively in discrimination
litigation.
• Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.B. 1968, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.A. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School. The author wishes to
thank Mikel Aickin for thoughtful and insightful comments on a draft of this Review. - Ed.
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, IO HARV. L. REV. 457,469 (1897).
2. Id at 459-61.
3. Id at 462.
4. On leaving the deanship at the Stanford Law School, Charles Meyers opined that "without knowing basic economics, lawyers simply will be unable to cope with the last fifth of the
20th century and the next century." Charles Meyers: Law School Visionary, CALlFORNlA
LAWYER, Oct 1981, at 47.
5. E.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387 (1981).
.
6. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRlMlNATION LAW 1162 (1976) (quoting
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962)).
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This, at any rate, is the thesis propounded by David Baldus, a
professor of law at the University of Iowa,7 and James Cole, a consulting statistician from Pittsburgh. 8 In Statistical Proof of.Discrimination they argue that quantitative approaches to detecting
discrimination have much to offer. Because they recognize that these
methods, like other powerful tools, can be dangerous if not handled
carefully, they have not written a treatise cataloging and indexing
every discrimination case that has discussed statistical proof. Instead, they have crafted a primer for the mathematical neophyte on
how statistical techniques ought to be used in ascertaining whether a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case9 of discrimination. 10 The
authors employ four hypothetical cases to illustrate various statistical
methods, both descriptive and inferential. They weave these paradigmatic cases into the fabric of established decisions. The result is a
rich tapestry of quantitative analysis and legal doctrine. Baldus and
Cole write at the frontiers of existing case law, and their work will
almost certainly exert a powerful influence on the law governing the
proof of discrimination. 11
Of course, none of this means that Statistical Proof of.Discrimination is beyond the pale of all criticism. The writing is generally careful, but sometimes less than pellucid. 12 At some points, it borders on
7. Professor Baldus, who also served as the Director of the National Science Foundation's
Law and Social Sciences Program, has written several important articles on quantitative techniques. E.g., Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive
Sentences of IJeath: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. l (1980).
8. Dr. Cole, formerly an assistant professor of statistics at the University of Iowa, also
collaborated with Professor Baldus in Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the JJeterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975).
9. The omission of explicit analysis of the use of statistical evidence in rebutting the prima
facie case has occasioned some criticism. See, Gruner, Book Review, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV,
441, 447-48 (1981).
10. Despite the care that Baldus and Cole take in presenting statistical methods in simple
terms, the statistically naive reader should not assume that the book will give him everything
he needs to undertake statistical studies, to test whether the assumptions of a statistical model
hold in an actual case, or even to hire a statistical consultant wisely. See Gerjuoy, Book Review, 66 A.B.A. J. 1100 (1980). For instance, there is no discussion of some common ways in
which even a correctly computed correlation coefficient can be misleading, cj A. EDWARDS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION 55-61 (1976) (problems with
small samples, combining samples, and restriction of range), or of the power of a classical
hypothesis test. See note 40 infra.
I offer this observation more as a caution to the over-enthusiastic reader than as a criticism
of the book. Any nonmathematical treatment of a mathematical subject can convey only a
limited understanding (as any reader of Scient!ftc American knows). Just as Statistical Proof of
JJiscrimination is not an exhaustive legal treatise, so too it is not a comprehensive statistics text.
It does, however, contain ample references to such texts.
11. For example, Statistical Proof contains the most elaborate analysis yet written for attorneys on how discrepancies between outcomes that would be expected in the absence of
discrimination and outcomes that are observed should be quantified. Pp. 144-60.
12. In their introductory assessment of quantitative proof, for instance, Baldus and Cole
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the tedious. 13 Although the preponderance of the arguments is convincing, a few are obscure 14 or troublesome. 15 But I do not desire to
belabor these occasional flaws or to detail for their own sake the organization or themes of the book. Other reviewers have traveled
these roads. 16 In the remainder of this Review, I hope to describe
more fully the sort of issues with which Baldus and Cole are concerned, to describe how a few of their insights might apply in the
context of a specific case, and to consider briefly some approaches
that depart from the classical statistical methodology that the authors pursue. I shall begin by describing the Supreme Court's disaplist as an "advantage of statistical proof' the fact that "[i]t can . . . provide a reliable basis for
inferring why individuals have been disadvantaged by a selection process," and they refer to
the capacity of statistical analysis "to assess causal arguments." Pp. 4-5. They then state that
"[t]he primary limitation of quantitative proof ... is its inability to support an inference about
the reasons for a particular decision, such as why a certain individual was hired or fired . . . ."
P. 5. Some of the confusion may be engendered by the unexplained use of the word "causal,"
which has a special meaning in multivariate statistics. See Cohn, Book Review, 55 N.Y.U. L.
R.Ev. 1295, 1302-10 (1980). I understand Baldus and Cole to be saying two things here:
(1) that statistical methods can demonstrate that a selection or allocation process has burdened
or benefited one group more than another, but this analysis cannot by itself establish the motivation behind this selection procedure; and (2) that even where the quantitative evidence
reveals a difference in the way two groups are treated, a further inference is required to conclude anything about individuals in these groups.
13. Thus, the first chapter on "Discrimination and Models of Proof' (pp. 9-52) enumerates
four "theories" (also called "models") of discrimination and another three "models" of proof
of the disparate treatment theory or model. Although analytic precision may warrant this
proliferation of concepts, one wonders whether the social scientists and statisticians for whom
this chapter is written, see p. 4, will not find more accessible overviews of the pertinent legal
doctrines elsewhere.
14. For example, in arguing that it is usually desirable to measure adverse impact by a
simple difference between two numbers (as opposed to a ratio), Baldus and Cole state that
"our analysis of the cases suggests that the assumption of the difference measure better approximates the disutility structure underlying the law in more situations than does the assumption
of the ratio measure." Moreover, they add, "we suggest that this will continue to be true in the
future, although in some respects it is an empirical question depending strictly on the facts of
the cases." P. 149. They do not explain how they were able to discern this underlying disutility structure in the unnamed cases they have in mind.
15. See note 69 infra. Consider also what Baldus and Cole say about the relation of the
ratio measure of adverse impact to the utility of money as a function of income:
The argument for ratios in wage and similar benefit cases rests on the generally accepted
premise that a $1,000 deprivation of salary is less important to someone in the $20,000
range than to someone in the $10,000 range. Consequently, a $1,000 deprivation may
represent greater harm to someone in the latter group than to someone in the former.
Moreover, it may well be that the 5 percent loss of $1,000 to someone in the $20,000
income range represents the same actual harm as would a 5 percent loss of $500 to someone earning $10,000 per year. If this is true, it would also tend to support the use of a ratio
measure in these cases, smce the percentage loss or relative disparity IS simply one form of
the ratio measure.
P. 155. The problem is that neither the claim that the utility of money is a logarithmic function
of income nor the contention that interpersonal comparisons of utility are meaningful is "generally accepted" by psychologists, economists and others who have investigated and developed
the theory of utility. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND 0PERATI0!'1S ANALYSIS
193-95, 421-32 (4th ed. 1977).
16. See Cohn, supra note 12; Gerjuoy, supra note 10; Gruner, supra note 9.
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pointing treatment of statistical proof in Hazelwood School .District v.
United States, 11 a well-known employment discrimination case.
Second, I shall indicate what the attorney who has mastered Statistical Proof of .Discrimination might have to say about this unhappy
opinion. Finally, I shall examine the statistical evidence in Hazelwood with the aid of two theories of statistical inference not seriously considered in Statistical Proof.

l.

HAZELWOOD V. UNITED STATES AND ''THE MAN
OF STATISTICS"

In Hazelwood, the United States brought an action under title
VII against a St. Louis County, Missouri, school district. The government alleged that the district was engaging in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in hiring teachers. To demonstrate the
existence and extent of this pattern, the government pointed to,
among other things, data showing that although 15.4% of the teachers in the geographical region were black, the comparable proportion
among Hazelwood's teaching staff was only 1.4% and 1.8% in 19721973 and 1973-1974, respectively.
The district court held that these statistics were "nonprobative"
on the curious ground that the percentage of black students in the
school district was also trifiing. 18 This amounts to saying that a
school district can refuse to hire black teachers as long as there are
not too many black students around. The court of appeals reversed
and directed judgment for the government. It reasoned that the
proper comparison was between the proportion of black teachers in
the Hazelwood district and the proportion of black teachers in the
labor market from which the district drew its teachers. If many
black teachers were available for employment, but only few were
hired, it would be natural to suspect ~t the hiring process was biased against blacks. The court of appeals thus held that the figures
given above constituted a prima facie (and unrebutted) case of racial
discrimination.
The Supreme Court differed with the court of appeals. To be
sure, it agreed that the district court's reasoning was "fundamentally
misconceived," 19 which is a polite way to put it, but it questioned
whether the relevant labor market included the City of St. Louis. It
observed that if the city were excluded from the market, the percent17. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
18. 433 U.S. at 304.
19. 433 U.S. at 308.
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age of black teachers would plummet from 15.4 to 5.7, which would
put things more in line with the figures for Hazelwood's staff. It
therefore vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for findings on the scope of the
relevant labor market.
To support its intuition that with the City of St. Louis excluded,
the statistics might not create a prima facie case, the Court offered a
learned footnote seemingly steeped in statistical wisdom:
[U]nder the statistical methodology . . . involving the calculation of
the standard deviation as a measure of predicted fluctuations, the difference between using 15.4% and 5.7% as the areawide figure would be
significant. If the 15.4% figure is taken as the basis for comparison, the
expected number of Negro teachers hired by Hazelwood in 1972-73
would be 43 (rather than the actual figure of 10) of a total of 282, a
difference of more than five standard deviations; the expected number
in 1973-74 would be 19 (rather than the actual figure of 5) of a total of
123, a difference of more than three standard deviations. For the two
years combined, the difference between the observed number of 15 Negro teachers hired (of a total of 405) would vary from the expected
number of 62 by more than six standard deviations. Because a fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations would undercut the
hypothesis that decisions were being made randomly with respect to
race . . . each of those statistical calculations would reinforce rather
than rebut the Government's other proof. If, however, the 5.7% areawide figure is used, the expected number of Negro teachers hired in
1972-1973 would be roughly 16, less than two standard deviations from
the observed number of 10; for 1973-1974, the expected value would be
roughly seven, less than one standard deviation from the observed
value of 5; and for the two years combined, the expected value of 23
would be less than two standard deviations from the observed total of
15,20

To readers not versed in statistics, this footnote must seem formidable indeed. Yet, the essence of what the Court is saying is obvious
enough, and an attentive reading of Statistical Proof of .Discrimination should dispel most of the mystery. 21 Even if an employer makes
hiring decisions without regard to race, it is always possible that the
proportion of blacks hired will differ slightly from the proportion in
the pool of all the applicants. Even large discrepancies are possible,
though they are less likely than small ones. This phenomenon of
random fluctuation, or sampling error, is familiar enough. After all,
20. 433 U.S. at 311 n.17.
21. For Baldus's and Cole's explanation of the Hazelwood calculations, see pp. 294-97. See
generally w. CONNOLLY, JR. & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
LITIGATION 74-83 (1979); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 78-80 (1980); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HAsTINGS L.J. 59, 72-75 (1980).
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if one tosses a balanced coin ten times, there can be no guarantee
that exactly five heads will tum up. Similarly, if one blindly draws
ten marbles from an um containing ten black marbles and ninety
white ones, there is no guarantee that any particular number so obtained will be black. By chance alone, all the marbles sampled
might tum out to be white. Or, several might be black.
·
The mathematical theory of probability enables us to quantify
the chances involved. In the example of the um, the probability that
no black marbles will appear in any given sample of ten is a little
less than .04. That is, even if the drawings were perfectly fair, the
outcome would grossly favor whites (and perhaps appear biased)
about four times out of every one hundred.
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court is asserting that with the teachers
in the City of St. Louis removed from the applicant pool, the seemingly small proportion of black teachers hired is sufficiently close to
the proportion in the labor market that the modest discrepancy has a
good chance of arising from sampling error rather than from bias in
hiring. Indeed, the Court says that the chance is so high that it may
"weaken" the government's claim of discrimination. 22
Equipped with the explanations in Statistical Proefef.Discrimination, an astute advocate or commentator should find fault with this
conclusion on a variety of grounds. 23 At the outset, he might question the entire effort to compare the proportion of black teachers that
the Hazelwood district had hired to the proportion of black teachers
in the suburban schools as a whole. The comparison ideally should
involve only those teachers available for employment with Hazelwood, and ordinarily those who have in fact applied provide the best
indication of this pool of potential applicants.24 The Supreme Court,
recognizing that data involving such teachers might be preferable to
that used by the government, noted in remanding the case that "[i]t
will be open to the District Court . . . to determine whether sufficiently reliable applicant-flow data are available to permit consider22. 433 U.S. at 311.
23. Baldus and Cole disapprove of rigid hypothesis testing at the .05 level, although they
do not mention this view in their discussion of Hazelwood See p. 308. Oddly, most of the
commentary of Hazelwood, even that which focuses on the Court's use of statistical reasoning,
is almost entirely uncritical. See, e.g.' F. MORRIS, JR., CURRENT TRENDS IN THE UsE (AND
MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 38-39 (2d ed. 1978); C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 78-80.
24. Baldus and Cole argue that "a general presumption should exist in favor of actual
applicant data as a preselection basis of comparison. • . . [T]he unavailability of actual applicant data, or the possibility of distortion from the use of applicant flow data, can provide a
basis for using a pool of potential applicants as a proxy for the people who would have applied
under conditions of normal labor supply." P. 106 (footnote omitted). They offer guidelines for
construction of such "proxy populations." Pp. 115-34.
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ation of the . . argument that those data may undercut a statistical
analysis dependent upon hirings alone." 25 On this point, at least, the
"man of statistics" will find that the Supreme Court's opinion passes
muster.
But the "man of statistics" will be sorely troubled by how the
Court used the data before it. It may be trite to say that a little
knowledge is a dangerous thing, but in the case of the statistical reasoning in Hazelwood it is true enough. In suggesting that a high
probability of sampling error tends to prove the absence of discrimination, the Court is doing what careful statisticians always warn
against - trying to prove the "null hypothesis." 26 Under the classical theory of hypothesis testing, all that can be said is that the numbers do not compel us to reject the thought that the hiring process is
free from racial discrimination. Of course, the failure to find something is usually a good indication that it is not there, but a statistical
analysis of how a negative finding might ''weaken" the government's
case would require techniques that go beyond the classical methodology to which the Court refers. 27
Moreover, even in its own terms, the Court's reasoning seems
faulty. To see the problem, we must understand where the "rule"
about two or three standard deviations comes from. The standard
deviation is a measure of how widely varied a set of numbers is.
(For those who like formulas, it is calculated by finding the mean of
all the numbers, subtracting this mean from each number, squaring
this difference for each number, adding all the squares together, dividing by size of the set, and finally extracting the square root of the
resulting quantity.) When the disparity between the number of
blacks actually hired and the number expected in a race-neutral process (without any sampling error) is measured in units of standard
deviations, it is easy to deduce the probability that the observed disparity is the result of sampling error if certain conditions hold. For
brevity, I shall not explain the details of this process. Suffice it to say
that in situations where one has no idea in which direction the disparity will lie, a discrepancy of roughly two standard deviations in a
large, randomly drawn sample implies that the probability that such
a difference would arise by chance alone is no more than .05, or one
25. 433 U.S. at 313 n.21.
26. In a rare article finding "fundamental flaws" in Hazelwood, Smith and Abram make
this point. Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment JJiscrimination,
1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 33, 52-53.
27. See notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text.
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out of twenty. Three standard deviations corresponds to a
probability of about .001, or one out of a thousand.
So the Hazelwood Court's reasoning comes down to this: With
the City of St. Louis excluded from the labor market, the probability
that so few blacks would be hired by reason of chance alone is larger
than .05, and as long as this chance remains even slightly higher than
this .05 level, the statistical evidence ''weakens" the claim that hiring
is improperly influenced by race. Yet, modem statisticians do not
woodenly insist on a significance level of .05. Although the .05 level
has become conventional in social science research, most thoughtful
statisticians deplore the convention and urge that researchers state
the probability level involved to permit the reader to reach his own
conclusion about the significance of the result. 28 The fact that many
social scientists feel that they should not claim to have discovered
something new unless they can attach a probability value of less than
.05 to the likelihood that they are merely observing sampling error
hardly means that such small probability values are required in
proving facts in civil cases.29 A researcher may not wish to rush into
print only to be contradicted by his colleagues when they attempt to
replicate his results. He may wait to gather more data instead of
putting his reputation on the line and perhaps causing others to
spend time and money verifying tentative and misleading results.
The concerns and values of social science, however, do not necessarily govern legal proceedings. In civil litigation, a less demanding
more-probable-than-not standard is ordinarily employed. The
Court is wrong in suggesting that a plaintiff does not make out a
prima facie case under this standard unless the probability associated with sampling error is below .05.30 Depending on the other evidence in the case, a much higher- or lower-value may suffice. 31
Furthermore, even if the arbitrary choice of the .05 level were
more defensible, the attorney familiar with Statistical Proof of .Dis28. E.g., D. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 291-93 (1979); Skipper,
Guenther & Nass, The Sacredness of.OJ.· A Note Concerning the Uses of Statistical Levels of
Sign!ficance in Social Science, in STATISTICAL IssuES: A READER FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCI•
ENCES 141 (R. Kirk ed. 1972).
29. See Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemib/e" .Dflferences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH, L. REv. 644, 658-59 (1975).
30. See Smith & Abram, supra note 26, at 43-44.
31. Baldus and Cole also argue that the appropriate significance level will vary according
to the type of discrimination case involved. P. 318. The only example they offer is a comparison of a challenge to a capital sentence and an attack on an employer's practices. If the significance level should differ in these two situations, it must be because the burden of persuasion which turns on the relative costs of type I and type II errors, see, e.g., Kaplan, .Decision Theory
and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN, L. REv. 1065 (1968), - is a function of these costs. q:
note 41 i'!fra (discussing these types of mistakes).
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crimination should wonder whether the Court was simply mistaken
in concluding that the .05 test was not satisfied by the statistical evidence in Hazelwood. I stated earlier that two standard deviations
correspond to a probability of .05 !f. among other things, one has no
reason to expect that the difference between the proportion for the
labor pool and for the teachers hired will be in one direction as opposed to the other (a "two-tailed" test). In Hazelwood, however, the
question is whether the employer is discriminating against a protected group. Therefore, the statistical problem in classical terms is
to calculate how likely it is that the number of black teachers hired
would be so much less than the number that race-neutral selection
would produce in the absence of any sampling error.32 Putting the
question this way requires a "one-tailed" test and implies that it
takes not two, but only 1.64 standard deviations to reach the .05
level. For the two-year period for which figures on hiring are described in the Hazelwood opinion, the number of standard deviations is less than two, as the Court states. But it is more than 1.64.
By my calculation, it is 1.73, which corresponds to a probability of
.04 of a sampling error. Consequently, one might well conclude that
even at the demanding .05 level the Court arbitrarily selected, the
chance that so few black teachers would be hired over the two-year
period if selections really were independent of race is small enough
to warrant rejecting the view that the school district did not discriminate against blacks.
I hope that this evaluation of the use of statistical methods in
Hazelwood does not foster the impression that statistical analysis
should be avoided at all costs. The Court performed poorly in Hazelwood not because it knew too much about statistical reasoning,
but because it knew too little. Mathematical analysis cannot dictate
answers to legal issues, but as Baldus and Cole urge, it can be a
valuable aid in certain litigation. As the courts gain experience with
statistical techniques in discrimination cases, they will learn to avoid
32. In technical jargon this is to say that a one-tailed test should be used in preference to
the Hazelwood two-tailed test. A law clerk to Justice Stevens appears to have recognized the
issue. See Hazelwood v. United States, 433 U.S. at 318 n.5 {dissenting opinion). Baldus and
Cole avoid taking a stand on this issue. They write that ''no strong conventions exist on the
subject," but note that "statistics texts frequently recommend the use of a one-tailed test when
the only question of interest is the likelihood of a difference in one direction . . . ." P. 307.
They use two-tailed tests in their examples but suggest that "[s]ince there is no clear answer to
this question, the most desirable approach is an awareness of the conceptual and practical
differences between the two types of tests and a consistent use of the same type of test in
similar cases whenever practical." P. 308. For a sampling of the social science literature on
the propriety of one- versus two-tailed tests, see Jones, Tests ofHypotheses: One-Sided vs. 1woSided Altematives, in R. KIRK, supra note 28, at 276-90.
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errors like those made in Hazelwood. In the meantime, the learning
process is bound to be slow and, I fear, painful.

II.

WHERE

Do

WE

Go

FROM HERE?

A. Must We Think About Statistical Signfftcance?

In the hope of accelerating this learning process, I would like to
canvass various alternatives to the hypothesis testing prospective
adopted in Hazelwood. 33 Four of the five approaches that I shall
enumerate are discussed in Statistical Proof of Discrimination, although the quality and depth of treatment varies widely.
One such alternative is simply not to bother inquiring into statistical significance at all. This is not an entirely frivolous suggestion.
In Hazelwood itself, the Court noted that its calculations were "not
intended to suggest that precise calculations of statistical significance
are necessary in employing statistical proof . . . ." 34 There is also
some academic support for this view. 35 Those of this persuasion who
are also statistically sophisticated argue that "[w]hen the data comprise all the observations of the defendant's reward allocation process (i.e., the [whole] universe or population of observations),
statistical inferences and tests of statistical significance are
inappropriate."36
For anyone who appreciates Carlyle's quip that "I don't pretend
to understand the Universe - it's a great deal bigger than I am," 37
this "whole universe" argument fails. The numbers generated in a
discrimination case describe only a sample of observations, but truly
interesting conclusions concern a larger population. Statistical inference - the process of saying something intelligent about an entire
population on the basis of sample data - is therefore unavoidable.
Take the hiring process in Hazelwood. Certain teachers interviewed
33. The hypothesis testing in Hazelwood was presaged by a similar analysis (rejecting the
null hypothesis) in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Castaneda, the Court recognized that in speaking of how two or three standard deviations are necessary to establish statistical significance, it was simply stating a convention adopted in social science. 430 U.S. at 496
n.17. In Hazelwood the Court quoted from Castaneda, but it dropped Castaneda's qualifying
language.
34. 433 U.S. at 312 n.17.
35. Cohn, supra note 12, at 1304-07; Cohn, On the Use ofStatistics in Employment JJiscriml•
nation Cases, 55 IND. L.J. 493, 494-99 (1980); authorities cited at p. 316 n.46. For contrary
views see pp. 316-17; Shoben, In JJeftnse of JJisparate Impact Analysis Under Tille VII: A
Reply to JJr. Cohn, 55 IND. LJ. 515 (1980); Smith & Abrams, supra note 26, at 42-43 (citing
Freeman,Availability, Goals and Achievements in Affirmative Action: An Economic Perspective,
in PERSPECTIVES ON AVAILABILITY 95, 110 (Equal Employment Advisory Council 1977)).
36. Cohn, supra note 12, at 1305.
37. D. SCIAMA, THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 47 (1961) (quoting Carlyle).
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for jobs, and the school district hired some of them. Those who went
through this process should be thought of as a sample drawn from
the population of potential applicants. As a first approximation,
those whom the school district hired can be treated as a sample
drawn from this sample of actual applicants. Of course, the successful interviewees were not hired at random, but if the characteristics
legitimately considered in the hiring process are not correlated with
race, then the probability model used by the Court is an appropriate
one for estimating the probability that a sample selected on the basis
of these criteria would contain so few black teachers. Surely, this
probability (often called a p-value) is the kind of number that merits
attention in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination exists. A small enough p-value should lead us to think that the
simple race-independent model of hiring describes the actual selection process poorly. We should then ask the defendant to provide a
better model to rebut the charge of discrimination.38 As such, the
temptation to ignore the question of statistical significance by invoking the "whole universe" problem should be resisted.
B.

Unbridled Intuition

Since statistical inferences must be made, one way or another,
when quantitative evidence is introduced in discrimination cases, a
method that is both logically defensible and intelligible to judges or
juries should be employed. Elegant mathematical procedures are
not the only possibility. Presented with a numerical disparity in
group outcomes and the size of the sample giving rise to this statistic,
38. Cohn contends that "[r]elying on tests of statistical significance, based on the assumption that the unspecified determinants' effects on groups' outcomes are random, is a poor substitute for the proper modeling of the defendant's reward allocation process that would include
all the relevant determinants of rewards." Cohn, supra note 12, at 1306. Speaking as a sociologist about academic studies, he is correct. To build the most accurate and plausible model,
one should include all the important independent variables (taking into account problems that
small sample size and multicollinearity may create). The plaintiff in a law suit, however,
should not be required to build such an elaborate model if (1) the statistics derived from the
(inevitably) small sample data indicate that the cruder race-independent model does not come
close to explaining the apparent underrepresentation of blacks or some other protected class,
and (2) it would be difficult and expensive to develop the full model, or there is ample qualitative evidence of discrimination. The second condition is important in light of the problem of
"naked statistical evidence." See Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1980).
Cohn's argument against statistical inference is vital to his claim that Statistical Proof of
.Discrimination "fails to draw a sharp distinction between [causal inferences and statistical inferences] and misleads the reader by suggesting that statistical significance tests indicate the
strength of the causal inference that the defendant's discrimination caused group differences in
outcome." Cohn, supra note 12, at 1302. This criticism seems overdrawn in view of Baldus's
and Cole's admonition that "the test of significance speaks only to whether there is some difference in the universe . . . . [S]tatistical tests can tell us nothing, directly, about the cause of an
adverse impact . . . . [T)he test provides no basis for assigning a precise probability to possible causes." P. 320. But see note 42 infra.
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a fact-finder could simply try to intuit how likely it is that this difference results from something other than the luck of the draw. But
why should we not use valid statistical tools to provide the factfinder with additional information that is pertinent to his assessment
of this likelihood?39
C. P-Va/ues
With respect to the formal statistical methods that might be employed, I have already argued that testing the null hypothesis at a
fixed significance level such as .05, as in Hazelwood, is inadvisable.40
I would only add that if strict hypothesis testing is used, some indication of the so-called "power'' of the test or related quantities should
be given. 41 Baldus and Cole favor the more flexible procedure of
39. To be sure, unless we were to modify radically our legal procedures, most of the evidence in a discrimination case will have to be weighed intuitively, and in the end the statistical
evidence may have to be judged along with the qualitative evidence in some intuitive fashion.
Nonetheless, statistical techniques can aid in this intuitive process. CJ. p. 317 ("one is in a
better position to assess the long-run effects of a rule with the help of statistical tests than
without").
40. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
4 I. The power of a test is the probability that it correctly rejects the null hypothesis. It is
the complement of the probability that the test will accept the null hypothesis when that hypothesis is false. This latter probability is - or should be - of great interest in formulating or
evaluating an hypothesis test. If it is high, the test rarely will detect the defendant's discrimination. If it is low, the test is sensitive to the presence of discrimination - it is powerful.
Unfortunately, the relationship between this probability and a test's significance level is
complex, and it tends to be ignored in discussions of statistical proof of discrimination. E.g.,
C. SULLNAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21; Braun, supra note 21. But see
Dawson,Are Statisticians Being Fair lo Employment .Discrimination Plainl!/fs, 21 JURIMETRICS
J. 1 (1980) (examining the power of hypothesis tests that use chi-square as the test statistic),
Baldus and Cole do not address the topic (presumably because they argue against formal hypothesis tests in the first flace), and except in a footnote at page 291, they make no explicit
mention of this probability.
Accordingly, a brief description of the issue may be in order. In designing or adopting a
hypothesis test, one should keep two factors in mind: the probability that the test will reject
the null hypothesis when that hypothesis is in fact true, and the probability that the test will
fail to reject the null hypothesis even though that hypothesis is false. The first probability
measures the chance of what is variously called a type I error, a false rejection, a false positive
or a false alarm. Customarily denoted by the Greek letter ex, it is nothing other than the
significance level of the test. The second probability quantifies the chance of the opposite type
of error - a type II error, a false acceptance, a false negative, or an undetected signal. Customarily denoted by /3, its value is typically far harder to discern. It is not, as one might think,
1-cx.
·
The hypothesis test outlined in Hazelwood illustrates the situation. In always rejecting the
null hypothesis ofno discrimination at a significance level of cx=.05, the Court will erroneously
reject this hypothesis five percent of the time, since five percent of the cases triggering rejection
will occur due to chance alone, and the null hypothesis asserts the existence of such chance
results. On the other hand, suppose the null hypothesis is false. What is the probability that
the test will not detect this fact? It is not l-cx=.95. The alternative to the null hypothesis in
the Court's test is that the chance that each black applicant will be hired differs from .057, the
proportion of blacks in the relevant labor market. It could be .056, .999, .030303, or any other
number other than .057 between zero and one. For each such number - and the possibilities
are infinite - there is some probability that the test will still accept the null hypothesis. Imag-
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presenting the p-value, that is, the probability that the measured discrepancy is merely a chance fluctuation, one that would disappear in
an examination of the defendant's long-run behavior.42 The Hazelwood Court, it will be recalled, compared the "observed number'' of
black teachers hired over a two-year period (15) to the "expected
number" (23) derived from a probabilistic model in which the
chance of hiring a black teacher was .057 in each instance. The
Court took the .057 figure from the areawide data on the proportion
of black teachers in the suburban area, and it used the sample size
(the number of teachers, 405, who actually applied for positions in
the two-year period) to conclude (using the normal approximation to
the binomial distribution) that the p-value fell below the .05 significance level (using a two-tailed test). Had the Court followed
Baldus's and Cole's recommendation, and merely stated the p-value,
it would have noted that under the posited model of no discrimination the probability that no more than fifteen blacks would have
been hired is only .042.43 The calculation of such a quantity, Baldus
and Cole suggest, is ordinarily the task of the expert, but the evaluation of this number - which is an aspect of the assessment of the
probative force of the statistical evidence - lies within the peculiar
province of the judge or jury.44
ine, for example, that each black applicant stood a .047 chance of being hired. The resulting
probability of a gap as large or larger than the difference between the associated expected
number (19) and the observed number (15) would then be about .14. Thus, there is a .86
probability that the Court's hypothesis test would not detect any discrimination in Hazelwood's hiring practices even if those procedures reduced each black teacher's chance of being
hired from .057 to .047 (a reduction of 18 percent, depriving ten out of every thousand black
applicants of positions). When it comes to detecting this degree of discrimination, the Court's
test is not very powerful. The chance of a false alarm is small (.05), but the chance of an
undetected signal is large (.86).
For elementary, but more complete descriptions of the power of hypothesis tests, see, e.g.,
Y. CHOU, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 283-96 (2d ed. 1975); B. LINDGREN, G. MCELRATH & D.
BERRY, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 186-93 (4th ed. 1978). For a revealing but rather mathematical treatment of hypothesis testing from the standpoint of signal
detection theory, see J. MELSA & D. COHN, DECISION AND EsTIMATION THEORY 21-53 (1978).
42. This characterization is oversimplified. The p-value is computed on the assumption
that the null hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis entails a particular probability model with
specific parameters. See note 59 iefra. In Hazelwood, for example, the Court assumed that
selection was a Bernoulli process with the binomial parameter 8 = .057. Consequently, a very
small p-value suggests that either the parameter has some other value (8 ;I, .057) or that the
form of the model is wrong (selection of teachers is not a Bernoulli process). Cf. pp. 290-93
(discussing the use ofp-values in disparate treatment cases to reject a Bernoulli model in favor
of some other model involving "legitimate selection criteria" or "defendant's bias," and in this
way linking "causal inference" with "statistical inference").
43. This is the p-value that would be used implicitly in a one-tailed test. See note 32 supra.
For a two-tailed test, one would compare, in effect, the probability that the number of blacks
hired would be less than 16 or greater than 30 with the preset value a. This two-sided p-value
is .084, which is greater than a = .05 - the result mistakenly emphasized by the Court.
44. P. 308. Cf. R.A. FISHER (1955), quoted in A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD: AN AcCOUNT OF THE STATISTICAL CONCEPT OF LIKELIHOOD AND ITS APPLICATION TO SCIENTIFIC
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On pragmatic grounds, a few commentators question the desirability of producing p-values. Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky have
written that it "involves complicated calculations resulting in answers that are difficult to visualize and evaluate," and they complain
that "[e]ven with moderate sample sizes, small disparities result in
very low probabilities."45 Yet, the calculation of the p-values is not
difficult, and the concept of sampling error or measurement noise is
not beyond a court's comprehension. That with moderate or large
samples even trivial differences can have small p-values and therefore appear statistically significant should not trick most fact-finders
into thinking that such a disparity is also legally significant.46 This
concern does underscore the admonition that p-values should not be
considered in a vacuum, but the courts are not likely to shut their
eyes to the possibility that although the group difference is statistically significant, the degree of discrimination is itself de minimis.
For these reasons, the use of p-values as Baldus and Cole recommend seems superior to the alternatives of doing nothing in the way
of formal inference or of deciding according to rigid, classical hypothesis tests.
D. Prediction Intervals
Still, there is one more classical technique that promises to convey yet more information to assist the court in arriving at an ultimately intuitive assessment of the evidence. It is most easily
described in the context of an example, so I shall return to the Hazelwood case once more. Both the computation of the p-value and the
standard deviation "rule," or hypothesis test, use a "point estimate"
of twenty-three for the "expected number" of blacks hired. In other
words, these methods suppose that if repeated samples of 405 applicants were to be assessed under the Court's simple probability model
and if these samples were to be pooled, then the proportion of black
teachers in the ensuing collection of successful applicants would apINFERENCE, at v (1972) ("We [statisticians] have the duty of formulating, of summarizing, and
of communicating our conclusions in intelligible form, in recognition of the right of other free
minds to utilize them in making their own decisions"). Arguably, the p-value could be better
assessed if a statement of the power of an hypothesis test that treats the observed disparity as
(barely) significant were provided. See note 41 supra.
45. Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: Mandate far Multiple Source
Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 794 (1977). These objections are offered in the context of jury
selection cases. Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky note that "[t]he problem of sample size is not
so acute in employment discrimination cases" because "the sample size is the number of people hired and is typically small." Id at 794 n.101.
46. Baldus and Cole caution against this erroneous interpretation of statistical significance.
See pp. 317-20.
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proach 23/405. In the limit (as the pooled sample grew to engulf the
entire population of teachers in the relevant labor market47), the observed proportion would be the population proportion of 23/405.
But probability theory permits us to provide more than a point estimate of the number of successful blacks. Given the Court's
probability model, it is easy enough to compute an "interval estimate." Figure 1 presents several such prediction intervals.48
probability
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.95

1----f-1-i---<>----i----<O>--------I
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number of
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Figure 1. Prediction intervals for the number of black teachers
hired out of 405 applicants assuming that the probability of hiring a
black teacher is .057 in each instance. The observed number of
black teachers hired is 15, which lies outside the .90 prediction interval but inside the .95 prediction interval. The disparity is therefore
significant at the .10 level, but not at the .05 level, using a two-tail
test.

All the intervals are centered about the previous point estimate of
twenty-three, and the wider the interval, the more likely it is that the
number of blacks actually hired from a group of 405 applicants will
be included in the predicted interval. For example, the probability
that the number of blacks will be between eighteen and twenty-eight
is .75. In contrast, if we choose a wider prediction interval, say one
that runs between sixteen and thirty, we can be more confident that
the number of blacks hired will fall within the interval. Specifically,
the probability that this range of outcomes will contain the observed
outcome is .90. Saying the same thing another way, we predict that
the observed number will lie outside the interval [16,30] in only one
sample of 405 out of every ten. 49 The fact that the observed number
47. Since the pool of potential applicants changes as some teachers enter the market while
others leave, the population size is infinite.
48. Prediction intervals are akin to, but conceptually distinct from "confidence intervals."
Statistical Proof of .Discrimination gives a clear explanation of confidence "intervals and their
relation top-values and significance tests. Pp. 310-13.
49. The perceptive reader will recognize from this example that the confidence level p is
intimately related to the significance level a. Namely, p = 1-a. Consequently, interval estimates can readily be used to perform significance tests.

Michigan Law Review

848

[Vol. 80:833

does fall just outside this range (it is 15) reveals that either (1) we just
happen to have before us one of the unusual cases that arise ten percent of the time, or (2) the Court's no-discrimination model is a poor
description of the long-run characteristics of the hiring process.
This type of presentation is more elaborate than a terse statement
that the probability of picking no more than fifteen blacks on 405
tries would be .042 if the probability on each try were .057. While its
import is essentially the same as that of the p-value,50 it should be
useful in helping a court visualize the statistical issue and therefore
should be made available to supplement the p-value itself.51

Ill.

NONCLASSICAL ANALYSES

A. Likelihood

Although the full conceptual apparatus of p-values, prediction
intervals, and significance tests was not fashioned until the late
1920s,52 these techniques have already earned the sobriquet "classical." Contemporary statisticians all agree that these techniques are
of some use in evaluating limited observations of long-run phenomena. At the same time, many prominent statisticians believe that
other methods deal more effectively with the problem of statistical
inference. To appreciate these competing approaches, we must be
clear about the nature of ihe problem. As one leading text on mathematical statistics explains:
A problem of statistical inference or, more simply, a statistics problem
50. Since the .042 p-value is one-sided (it measures the probability that the number of
blacks selected would not exceed fifteen if each black's chance of selection were .057), it is
more closely connected with one-sided prediction intervals. I have displayed two-sided prediction intervals in the text only because it seems to me that these are slightly easier to grasp. The
corresponding one-sided prediction intervals are shown below:
p=l-a
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Since 15 is outside the prediction interval for p = .95, the small number of blacks hired is
significant at the .05 level (using the one-tailed test).
51. Cf. p. 310 (''the confidence interval answers a broader question than that addressed by
tests of significance"); Natrella, The Relation Between Confidence Intervals and Tests ofSign!ft•
cance, 14 AM. STATISTICIAN 20 (1960) (advocating more widespread use of confidence inter•
vals in statistical studies).
52. See, e.g., Dudycha, Behavioral Statistics: An Historical Perspective, in R. KIRK, supra
note 28, at 2, 21-24.
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is a problem in which data that have been generated in accordance
with some unknown probability distribution must be analyzed and
some type of inference about the unknown distribution must be made.
In other words, in a statistics problem there are two or more
probability distributions which might have generated some given experimental data. In some problems there could be an infinite number
of different possible distributions which might have generated the data.
By analyzing the data, we attempt to learn about the unknown distribution, to make some inference about certain properties of the distribution, and to determine the relative likelihood that each possible
distribution is actually the correct one.53
This is precisely what the Court was attempting to do in Hazelwood.

Looking at sample data (involving 405 applicants over a two-year
period), the Court asked whether it was reasonably likely that the
unknown distribution giving rise to the data (summarized by the
sample statistic that fifteen blacks were hired) was a so-called binomial distribution whose parameter was .057. 54 Because the
probability of the observed number's being generated by this distribution was a bit more than .05 (calculated by a two-tailed test), the
Court suggested that its tentative guess about the nature and details
of the unknown distribution was pretty good.
Upon reflection, however, this reasoning seems to leave out a
crucial ingredient. It certainly tells us something about how well the
binomial no-discrimination model fits the data, but it reveals nothing
about the accuracy of other models. If, under a revised model of the
hiring process, the probability of the observed statistic ~ould be
higher than that calculated under the Court's version, then this other
model would seem to emerge as a more likely prospect for the unknown distribution. While one must be wary of "overfitting" a
model to the data, a systematic way to look at the relative likelihood
of various hypotheses about the unknown distribution is available.
This procedure requires the construction of a "relative likelihood
function," a task that is not as complicated as it might sound. Let us
denote the unknown parameter of the posited binomial distribution
by the Greek letter 8, and let X stand for the number of black teachers actually hired.55 So far, we have treated X as a variable whose
53. M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 257 (1975).
54. A binomial distribution describes the probability of the number of "successes" for
some number of trials, where the outcome of any one trial is independent of the outcome of
any other trial. The probability of a success on any particular trial is a "parameter" of this
binomial distribution. See, e.g., id at 201. The probabilities of the various possible numbers
of heads obtained by flipping a fair coin ten times are given by a binomial distribution with the
parameters ten (for the number or trials, or the sample size) and .5 (for the probability of a
success on each trial).
55. The Court's approach tests the "null hypothesis' that 8 = .057 against the "alternative
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value is determined by the luck of the draw - that is, by random
sampling from an infinite population characterized by the binomial
distribution whose parameter 8 is .057. Now we treat X asjixedthe school district hired fifteen blacks - but we think of 8 as a variable that can take on values between zero and one. For each such
value of 8, there is some probability Pr(15;8) of obtaining the statistic
X=15 from the sample of 405 applicants. One special value of 8,
which we designate 8, maximizes this probability Pr(15;8). That is,
the probability of observing X= 15 is highest when 8 = 8. It turns
out, although I shall not prove it, that this maximum likelihood estimator of 8 is 8 = 15/405.
All this talk of 8's, 8's, and related probabilities may sound complicated, but the idea expressed should be intuitively plausible. Ifwe
flip a possibly unfair coin ten times, knowing nothing about how the
coin is weighted, and we observe a total of three heads, it is more
likely that the coin has a probability 8 = 3/10 of coming up heads on
each toss than that the coin is weighted in some other way. 56 In this
case, 8 would be 3/10. Since 8 maximizes Pr(15;8), it can serve as a
standard against which to judge other hypotheses about the true
value of 8. Suppose, for instance, someone exclaimed that in the
Hazelwood case 8 was not 8 = 15/405, but some larger number, say
23/405. We might respond by designating this newly suggested
value of 8 as 81 and calculating Pr(15;8 1)/Pr(15; 8). The number
would tell us how likely it is that 8 = 81 = 23/405 relative to the
more likely possibility that 8 = 8 = 15/405. Calling this ratio the
relative likelihood of 81 and denoting it by R(15;8 1), it is not hard to
show that R(15;8 1) = .19. In light of the observed value of X, the
hypothesis that 8 = 81 = 23/405 is about a fifth as likely as the hypothesis that 8 = 8 = 15/405. We can now repeat this procedure for
82 = some other possible value of 8 - for 83 , and so on. Doggedly,
the statistician (or his computer) finds the values of the relative likelihood function R(X;8). Figure 2 shows this function for the Hazelwood situation. Scanning such a graph should give the factfinder a
feeling for the plausible range of the true value of 8.
hypothesis" that 8 ~ .057. But, as the test is implemented by the Court, we learn nothing about
the probability of obtaining the sample statistic under this alternative hypothesis. Computing
this probability is no easy task. An entire family of binomial distributions in which the parameter 8 takes on all the values (except .057) between zero and one must be considered. See note
41 supra.
56. Anyone inclined to say that the coin is not likely to be this biased and probably is
characterized by a 8 closer to .5, is almost surely being influenced by his prior beliefs about the
prevalence of weighted coins. Likelihood methods, like classical inferential techniques, ignore
prior beliefs. The accepted statistical method for incorporating prior beliefs into the inference
problem is described at note 67 infra and accompanying text.
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Relative likelihood function R(X;8) for selecting X = 15
blacks out of 405 applicants where the probability of selecting each
black applicant is 8. The likelihood that 8 = .057 (which corresponds to the Hazelwood Court's no-discrimination hypothesis) is
about 18% of the likelihood that 8 = .037 (which is the most likely
value of 8 looking only to the number of blacks hired).

Figure 2.

It bears emphasizing that the statistical analysis merely produces
the picture. Defining the plausible range is not a mathematical operation.57 That is a question for a judge or jury. The purpose of generating a graph of the relative likelihood function is merely to give
57. Likelihood intervals can be defined to capture those values of 8 that yield relative
likelihoods above a fixed amount. See, e.g., J. KALBFLEISCH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL
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the factfinder more guidance than the classical p-value affords him.
Anyone who looks carefully at Figure 2 must wonder about the Hazelwood Court's suggestion that .057 is a convincing value for 0. If
the hiring process involves independent trials as the Court's null hypothesis presupposes,58 then it is hard to believe (on a preponderance·
of the evidence standard, looking solely to the statistical evidence)
that the probability that a black applicant will be hired is as high as
.057. And, if it is lower than .057, black applicants do not have the
same chance of being hired as white applicants do. 59
I fear that much of this likelihood analysis will seem confusing too abstract, or at the other extreme, too mired in the details of a
messy example.60 I have devoted substantial space to illustrating the
rudiments of the likelihood theory because I think it has some potential for use in discrimination litigation. Admittedly, it is not nearly
so familiar a way of thinking about the problem of statistical inference as are the classical methods that Baldus and Cole so ably discuss. Yet, any statistician who has seriously studied the
fundamentals of inference should admit that the likelihood function
contains all the information that the statistical findings can convey.
It forces the fact-finder to confront all the hypotheses concerning the
parameters of a probability distribution, and it avoids the arbitrary
character of hypothesis testing at a uniform significance level. I
would not say that it should replace p-values and prediction intervals (and their close cousins, confidence intervals), but it can supplement these standard methods.

B. Bayesian Inference
At this point, it might be wise to look back over the territory that
we have traversed. We have seen (or, rather, I have asserted) that
within the framework of a statistical model, the likelihood function
contains all the information that the data provide concerning the relINFERENCE II 22-27 (1979). But, as with prediction or confidence intervals, what threshold
figure to use is not a question that mathematics can answer. See note 44 supra.
58. Note 38 defends the general use of the binomial distribution model where the question
is whether the disparity in group outcomes is not only practically important, but also statistically reliable enough to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
59. Perhaps they should not have the same chance. Maybe white applicants are generally
more qualified than their black counterparts. But that is a point that the school district could
raise -with the aid of a more sophisticated statistical model of the hiring process if need be to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. See note 38 supra.
60. For a relatively simple description of likelihood theory using other examples, see
Sprott & Kalbfleisch, Use ofthe Likelihood Function in Inference, 64 PSYCH. BULL. 15 (1965).
A.W.F. Edwards, supra note 44, gives a philosophically oriented survey of likelihood theory.
For more detailed mathematical presentations, see, e.g., J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57; D.
FRASER, THE STRUCTURE OF INFERENCE 185-88, 295-316 (1968).
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ative merits of the possible hypotheses. The prediction interval
states a range within which the data would be expected to fall if the
nondiscrimination version of the model applies. The p-value gives
the probability that the data would be as observed in the specific
version of this same model of the selection or allocation process that
entails no discrimination. Oddly, none of these statistical constructs
tells us what we really want to extract from the statistical evidence in
a lawsuit: the probability, computed in light of the sample data, that
the defendant's selection or allocation process involves disparate
treatment or impact. Thus, in the Hazelwood situation, we have examined such things as Pr(X ~ 1518 = .057) - the probability that X,
the number of black teachers hired out of 405 applicants, would be
fifteen or fewer, given that each black applicant had the same .057
chance of being hired - and R(X;8) - the relative likelihood that 8
has various values, including but not limited to .057. 61 As yet, we
have exhibited no calculations of Pr(8 = .0571X = 15) - the
probability, conditioned on the observation that the school district
hired fifteen blacks, that each black applicant had the same .057
chance of being hired.
Neither likelihood methods nor classical techniques of inference
can ever produce this figure. Yet, there is a rich body of statistical
theory that permits such calculations. It goes by the name Bayesian
inference. 62 As is true of likelihood methods, it is not used as widely
as the classical theories, but it is becoming increasingly influential. 63
Bayesian inference employs likelihood ideas in a distinctive way.
It uses the likelihood function64 to convert a "prior'' probability dis61. This example may clarify the point that the important quantities in classical as well as
likelihood theories are computed within the framework of a statistical model. As I have previously noted, see note 42 supra, that model in this instance is called a Bernoulli model in which
the probability of a "success" on each trial is some fixed number 8, which is called the parameter of the model. See note 54 supra. Classical calculations (with the important exception of
the power function mentioned in note 41 supra) take the value of this parameter to be fixed
(for example, at .057). This version of the general model with the parameter so specified is
what is meant by the "null hypothesis." Likelihood methods presuppose the same general
model but treat the parameter 8 as a variable and thereby permit the decision-maker to assess
the innumerable versions of the model ignored by classical calculations ofp-values and prediction intervals.
62. It should not be confused with the Bayesian, or subjective interpretation of probability
(on which it builds). See Kaye, Tlze Laws ofProbability and the Law ofthe Land, 47 U. CHI. L.
Rev. 34, 50-52 n.56 (1979). This article lists several texts that explain Bayesian inference. See
generally M. DEGROOT, supra note 53; J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57, at 288-94; B. LINDGREN, G. MCELRATH & D. BERRY, supra note 41, at 219-32.
63. See, e.g., Schum, A Review ofa Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs, 77 MICH. L.
Rev. 446, 468 (1979).
64. The likelihood function L(X;8) differs only slightly from the relative likelihood function R(X;8). The latter is but a special case of the former.
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tribution that characterizes an observer's belief65 (about a population
parameter such as 8) into a "posterior'' distribution that takes account of the sample observations. For example, in the case of the
coin that came up heads three times out of ten, 66 I asserted that the
most likely value of a head appearing on each independent toss was
3/10. This number is the maximum likelihood estimate of 8, the
extent to which the coin is weighted, in light of the limited data
available. But if there were some prior reason to believe that the
coin was in reality evenly balanced (perhaps the owner of the coin, a
trustworthy soul, assured us that it is not a trick coin), we might be
troubled by the idea of embracing 3/10 as our best estimate of 8.
The 3/10 :figure is plainly relevant, but must it be determinative?
Bayesian analysis uses the sample data - the outcomes of the ten
tosses - to revise the prior belief. Depending on the strength of the
initial view that the coin is evenly balanced, a Bayesian would arrive
at a point estimate that would put 8 somewhere between .3 and .5.
The formal scheme for prescribing the impact of sample data on
a prior distribution could be adapted to legal proceedings, although
not as easily in discrimination cases67 as in certain other contexts. 68
Baldus and Cole toy with the idea but curtly dismiss it, partly because "courts are even less familiar with Bayesian methods than they
are with the methods of classical statistics." 69 Although it is difficult
65. Those who object in principle to Bayesian methods usually deny that it makes sense to
take a probability distribution as characterizing belief. See, e.g., G. SHAFER, A THEORY OF
EVIDENCE (1976); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal .Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978). Of course, Bayes's rule can work with "objective" prior
probability distributions instead of subjective ones. See J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57, at 291;
Kaye, supra note 62.
66. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
67. Sketching how one might proceed should convey some of the flavor of the difficulty of
institutionalizing Bayesian inference in the law. In a case like Hazelwood, where the plaintiff
alleged racial discrimination in hiring, the judge or jury could consider initially the plaintiffs
nonstatistical evidence - testimony about the opportunities for discriminatory decisions, remarks of personnel managers evincing racial bias, and the like - as well as figures on the
proportion of blacks in the relevant labor market or applicant pool. Under one approach, the
fact-finder could then draw a curve on a chart, a curve that would reach its peak at the factfinder's best estimate of 8 and that would spread out in accordance with the fact-finder's confidence in this estimate. A statistician could derive the likelihood function from the sample data
and apply it to this prior distribution via Bayes's rule to generate the posterior distribution.
This distribution would supply the probability that 8 is less than the proportion of blacks in the
relevant population. A less confining elaboration of this procedure 1s given in the text accompanying note 70 infta.
68. See Finkelstein & Fairley,A Bayesian Approach to Ident!fication Evidence, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1970); Fairley, .Probability Analysis ofIdent!fication Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1205
(1973); Lindley, A .Problem in Forensic Science, 64 BIOMETRIKA 207 (1977).
69. P. 304 n.32. After a brief allusion to the "lively debate [in the Harvard Law Review]
on the applicability of Bayesian methods to legal questions" they add that "[w]e know of no
court that has applied Bayesian methods to an evidentiary problem." Id But see Arizona v.
Wagner, No. DR122023 (Super. Ct., Maricopa County, Ariz. 1980); Everett v. Everett, No. D-
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to treat this as a serious argument,70 Baldus and Cole also comment
that "there is no judicially acceptable way we know of to quantify
. . . the prior distribution" (p. 304). Presumably, they have in mind
Professor Tribe's forceful critique of "trial by mathematics." 71 However, Tribe's arguments are not all of the same high caliber, and the
most penetrating are blunted or sidestepped by circumspect procedures for exposing judges or juries to Bayesian logic.72 Such procedures would not dictate the choice of" the final distribution or the
result in the case; they would merely demonstrate the probative force
of the sample data by displaying the effect of the data across a panoply of prior distributions. A fact-finder would be free to start with
any distribution that reflected his prior estimate of the unknown parameter, or to remain uncommitted to any specific estimate. He
could merely see how strongly the likelihood function for the sample
data affects various prior probability statements. For example, starting from the agnostic premise in Hazelwood that 0 is no more likely
to have one value between 0 and I than any other leads to the conclusion that, in light of the observed hiring rate, the probability that
the true value of 0 is less than .057 (!.e., that selection is discriminatory in terms of the Court's model) is a bit over 95 percent.
I make these points primarily to give Bayesian methodology its
fair hearing. I, too, would not urge its implementation in discrimination litigation. Even if the flexible use of Bayesian calculations
would be no more confusing to the fact-finder than the alternatives,
it would not provide that much additional guidance to the factfinder. Some resort to intuition still would be essential, and the marginal guidance from seeing the results on a cross section of distributions does not seem large enough to justify implementing the
procedure.
CONCLUSION

Lawyers and statisticians make strange bedfellows. Both are
skilled (or should be) in the analysis of evidence. Yet, the two pro850-370 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. 1981); Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proofl
Can HLA and Blood Tests Prove Paternity, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1131 (1979); Kaye, supra note
62, at 34 n.5 (referring to other cases applying Bayesian methods to an evidentiary problem,
although not necessarily in a considered or deliberate way).
70. The argument from unfamiliarity is weak at best. See Ellman & Kaye, supra note 69,
at 1158. It is especially troublesome in a work that aspires to be a response to "[t]he challenge
. . . to weigh intelligently the strengths and weaknesses of the available methods and to use
them creatively to focus on what is at issue under the substantive law." P.3.
71. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971).
72. Ellman & Kaye, supra note 69, at 1154-57.
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fessions often reach apparently divergent conclusions about what
counts as "evidence" and about what inferences can properly be
drawn from such evidence.73 Indeed, the legal profession has long
resisted the allure of quantified methods of proof, partly out of the
realization that values other than accuracy in factfinding are sometimes central to the proper resolution of legal disputes. 74 Nevertheless, the ability to ascertain the true state of affairs is important, and
there are instances in which statistical data can enhance the quality
of judicial decision-making. Especially in discrimination litigation,
quantitative analysis is becoming, if not de rigeur, at least an accepted method of proof. Statistical Proof of .Discrimination represents a sustained effort to make this kind of analysis understandable
and useful to attorneys and courts involved in such litigation. There
is surely more to be said on the subject,75 but Statistical Proof is an
excellent contribution to a burgeoning cross-disciplinary literature.
Read in conjunction with a good elementary statistics textbook, 76 it
can be an invaluable guide to the perplexed.

73. L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).

14. See Tribe, supra note 71.
75. The National Academy of Sciences' Committee on National Statistics is studying the
use of statistics in litigation, and the National Science Foundation has funded a University of
Minnesota study along these same lines. In addition, an exchange of papers on many of the
issues canvassed in this Review as well as some related ones is scheduled for publication in the
Journal of the American Statistical Association.
76. Nicely written works that use a minimum of mathematics include G. KIMBLE, How TO
USE (AND MISUSE) STATISTICS (1978); D. MOORE, supra note 28; J. PHILLIPS, JR., STATISTICAL
THINKING: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH (1973); E. WILLEMSON, UNDERSTANDING STATISTI·
CAL REASONING: How TO EVALUATE REsEARCH LITERATURE IN THE BEHAVORIAL SCIENCES
(1974).

